This paper focuses on the interdependence between international trade and in institutional reform, and suggests that the trade barriers erected by advanced countries to the agricultural exports from poor countries, and subSaharan agriculture in particular, are a barrier to economic growth and development. Drawing upon recent literature, the suggestion is that trade barriers inhibit institutional reform which is a major factor affecting economic growth. An empirical analysis of trade reform and economic growth shows that sub-Saharan economies can repeat potential gains from increased trade that are larger when such integration with world markets induces institutional reform. 
Introduction
The surge in real income growth during the last three decades of the 20-th century lifted more people from poverty than any previous time in world history. The $1/day poverty rate has fallen from 20 per cent of the world's population to 5 percent over the last twenty five years. The $2/day rate has fallen from 44 percent to 18 percent. There are between 300 and 500 million less poor people in 1998 than there were in the 1970s (Sala-i-Martin, 2001: 16-18) . Economists associate this unprecedented rise in wellbeing to the fundamental economic forces driving the globalizing of world markets Warner, 1995, and Baldwin and Martin, 2000) .
Nevertheless, many regions of the world are not participating in what might be termed the gains from globalization. About 19 percent of the world's population live on only 1.3 percent of the world's income (Shane, Teigen, Gehlhar, and Roe, 2000: 300-302 The main features of economic growth in real per capita incomes are easily identified. They include growth in the stock of human and physical capital, technological change, and for most countries, the transition of labor out of agriculture and other primary good producing sectors of the economy, and into higher value added sectors of manufacturing and services.
Fundamental to this transition is the micro -firm level environment that provides incentives and opportunities for productivity growth, including variety and quality of products that allow markets to remunerate resources at sustained and growing rates of return. For most countries, this environment cannot be created in isolation from the rest of the world. Countries with strong and sustained records of economic growth engage in the international transfers of physical and human capital, including the business practices and technical expertise of foreign companies and foreign expertise in services such as banking and insurance.
Macroeconomic policies such as fiscal, monetary, exchange rate and trade policy are necessary but not sufficient to create this micro-firm level environment. Institutions granting enforceable rights to physical and intellectual property, to govern competition among firms, legal structures to adjudicate commercial disputes, development of codes of conduct to assure transparent financial institutions, and the provision of public goods for 4 transport and education that can be sustained by what the polity considers to be within the realm of the social good, are critical components of the microfirm level environment necessary to encourage the adoption of new technologies and capital deepening. The daunting question is how to create the necessary institutions?
Focus and organization of the paper
It is likely that institutional reform is interdependent with globalization.
Then the question is: which comes first, productivity and growth from which evolve institutions, or institutions from which evolve productivity and growth? Is foreign trade a vehicle for inducing institutional change? But if this is the case, then is it possible that the agricultural trade barriers of the advanced nations are a barrier to institutional reform of low income countries whose economies are relatively dependent upon agriculture? The purpose of this paper is to discuss and bring some evidence to bear on these questions, particularly as this relates to sub-Saharan agriculture.
The paper begins with an overview of the recent literature on geography, institutions and international trade as an explanation for the differences in income levels between advanced an poor nations. This discussion suggests the link between institutions and the economic opportunitie s, opportunities 5 precipitated by the same forces that are inducing the globalization of markets, may be a deriving force for institutional change.
Whether sub-Saharan countries can benefit from more trade, and hence induce institutional reform, depends on whether they can expand their trade opportunities. Since these are primary commodity exporters, of which for most this means agriculture products, their agricultural trade patterns are briefly reviewed. This review suggests these countries tend to export commodities for which the advanced economies pursue import-substitution polices. Is it possible that these policies are more than a barrier to trade, but that they are also a barrier to institutional reform in many of sub-Saharan countries? Drawing upon previous work, the importance of these barriers to trade are shown. The last subsection focus on an analysis of sub-Saharan Africa to show how the effects of possible increases in total factor productivity that is linked to institutional and trade reform can greatly raise per capita income over a forty year period. Final remarks conclude the paper.
Overview of sources of economic growth
Three lines of thought have emerged to explain the key sources of economic growth. One line centers on geography (Bloom and Sachs, 2001) as a determinant of climate, natural resource endowments, disease burden, 6 transport costs and the extent of diffusion of technology, all of which are associated with the low income countries of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Bloom and Sachs suggest that the geographic features associated with poor economies also foster extractive forms of governance. Another line of thought centers on international trade as a driver of productivity change and income growth. Levin, R and D. Renelt (1992) were among the first to establish a strong statistical evidence for a positive growth to trade linkage.
This linkage was later reinforced by others (e.g., Sachs and Warner (1995) ), and further developed by Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1997) who identified R&D spillovers among nations due to the technology content embodied in imports and exports that stimulated growth.
The third line of thought focuses on institutions. Recent work in this area is that of Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002), and MacFarlan, Edison and Spatafora (2003) . Rodrik et al. (2002) , use a composite indicator to capture the protection afforded to property rights and the strength of the rule of law. These are referred to as market-creating institutions since markets either do not exist or perform poorly in their absence. This indicator over time and countries allows them to distinguish between geography, trade and institutions in explaining the gap between rich and poor countries. They conclude from their empirical analysis that the quality of institutions is the 7 only positive and significant determinant of income levels. Once institutions are controlled for, integration (i.e. foreign trade) has no direct effect on incomes, while geography has at best weak direct effects. However, integration was also found to have a positive impact on institutional quality.
This result suggests that trade can have an indirect effect on incomes by improving institutional quality. We return to this theme later. 
Linking trade and institutional reform
Institution al reform induced by economic events can be illustrated using the case of Mexico in the 1980s. Shane, 1992: 90-91 suggests that the prospect of long term stagnation of the Mexican economy, and declining per capita incomes undermined confidence in the Institutional Revolutionary Party. Under the leadership of Salinas, major policy initiatives were made as early as 1988 when Mexico joined the GATT. Many of the country's state owned enterprises were liquidated and privatized, and limits on foreign ownership shares in Mexican companies were relaxed. These changes removed instruments of the state that were most prone to rent seeking on the part of special interests, and in the process, initiated major institutional reforms that while extending rights to foreign interests in the domestic economy also extend rights to Mexican citizens and limited the power of elite special interest groups. Institutional reform was initiated when the difference between the prospect of stagnation compared to the opportunities of opening the country to world markets offered sufficient potential to induce a change in policy. This "trickle" down institutional change is still on-going. Rodrik (2002: 4-6) lists property rights, regulatory institutions, institutions for macroeconom ic stabilization (e.g., managing fiscal deficits), institutions have experienced at least one economic collapse, including Turkey, Indonesia, Argentina. In the case of Mexico, it may be conjectured that the collapses experienced led to a strengthening and reform of her institutions.
This discussion suggests that while trade reform is not sufficient to induce institutional reform, a link between the two nevertheless exists. Trade reform entails: the importation of institutions from abroad; membership in the WTO requires the adoption of a set of institutional norms that rent seekers find more costly to change; financial integration raises the premium for macroeconomic stability, the freer flow of information encourages civil liberties and political freedom, government enforcement to protect the rights of foreign investors induces government to become more inclined to protect the basic human rights of its own citizens as well.
If foreign trade is an important link to institutional reform, what evidence
suggests that the agro -climatic endowments of sub-Saharan Africa are conducive for an expansion of trade, and if so, with whom? Are the agricultural policies of the U.S. and the E.U. a barrier to increasing agricultural exports from sub-Saharan Africa? If these barriers were removed, and institutional change occurred that led to gains suggested by Rodrik et al. (2002), and MacFarlan, et al. (2003) , what is the approximate 11 magnitude of these gains? These questions are addressed in the remaining sections of the paper.
Do sub-Saharan agricultural trade patterns suggest possible gains from trade?
The potential for countries to benefit from the lowering of agricultural trade barriers among themselves, and barriers erected by advanced countries should depend, in part, on the share of agriculture in their total trade, and on their agricultural trade pattern. In our previous work, Diao, Roe and Somwaru (2002: 783) , we show that agricultural exports accounted for more than 40 percent of total exports for a relatively large grouping of seven developing country regions, and to range from 15 to 30 percent for a larger eleven developing country grouping. For the entire set of developing countries in the world, the share of agriculture in total trade averaged about 10 percent. Agricultural export shares for the thirty-three sub-Saharan countries ranged from 20 to 80 percent of total exports.
Pertaining to trade patterns, Diao, Somwaru and Roe, (2001: 27) show the importance of three of the largest markets in the world, (Japan and Korea, North America, and the EU), to the exports of agric ulture from developing countries. Excluding intra-EU trade, developing countries account for 60 to 12 80 percent of world exports of commodities that are relatively labor and/or water intensive, such as vegetables and fruits, cotton, sugar, and vegetable oil. Thus, developing country export markets for agriculture are largely in the North.
These data also show that the EU is a far more important agricultural market for African countries than is North America. Latin America exports a large share of its agricultural crops, outside of grains, to North America, as do a few Asian countries. While Japan and Korea are known to have relatively high agricultural tariffs, their agricultural import pattern appears to be spread across more countries.
The tariff rate on vegetables and fruits in the EU is twice the level as that in Japan and Korea, and seven times higher than that in North America (USDA/ERS, 2001). The observed level of sub-Saharan agricultural exports to the EU, while relatively large, is almost surely biased downward by these barriers.
A global general equilibrium model was developed to assess the extent of these barriers on international agricultural trade, the details of which can be found in Diao et al. (2002) . The analysis focuses on the three disciplines: tariffs (market access), domestic support and export subsidies. The analysis decomposes the global effects of a full reform by type of policy and by 13 commodity. The reforms investigated are (1) eliminating agricultural import barriers (tariff equivalents) throughout the world; (2) eliminating agricultural export subsidies throughout the world; (3) eliminating domestic support in the developed countries; and (4) combinations of these scenarios.
In terms of changes in production levels, the removal of all three forms of interventions (tariffs, export subsidies, and domestic support) causes production increase across almost all agricultural categories in the less developed countries as a group.
The effects on exports from SSA to the EU are particularly large. The results show that for twenty-seven of the thirty-five country groups in the model, 50 percent or more of the increase in their agricultural exports is due to liberalizing EU agriculture.
Clearly, these results suggest that an open EU market is in the common interest of most developing countries, and particularly so for those in SSA.
Is it likely that opening this market to SSA countries could induce "trickle down" institutional reform?
The case of sub-Saharan Africa
Sections 4 and 5 showed that countries can benefit from globalization, but the process is linked to institutional change and increased openness. (2001) and Roe et al. (2003: 9-13 ). Our purpose is to illustrate the type of gains in real per capita income that could accrue to this economically depressed region over a fifty year period.
In order to suggest the magnitude of the possible increase in TFP, we draw on the paper by Gopinath and Roe (1997) . They found that about 0.69 percentage points of U.S. agriculture's total factor productivity of about 2.1 percent was due to public investments in infrastructure (this includes electrification, roads, public buildings) during 1959 -1968 period.
Estimates of growth in sub-Saharan Africa's factor productivity at the national level is very small, about 0.02 percent per annum. This estimate compares to 1.0 percent per annum for the U.S. over the period [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] 15 and 1.9% for the period 1996-1998 (Marquez, 2001) The second simulation considers at TFP shock of 2.39 percent (0.69 + 1.7).
The base solution
The rate of transition growth in GDP per capita is shown in figure 7 The differences in the relative evolution of output of the three sectors is due largely to the relative capital intensity of the various sectors. As capital accumulates, the service sector benefits relative to the other sectors because it is relatively capital intensive. As capital accumulates in this sector, labor productivity rises which allows the service sector to bid up wages. The sector placed at a relative disadvantage from the rise in labor wage is manufacturing because it employs labor more intensively than do the other sectors. In the long run, the output of all sectors grow at the same rate of 0.02 percent per capita per year.
Experiment: the dynamic effects of infrastructure
The rate of transition and long-run growth in GDP per capita is shown in The manufacturing sector expands relative to agriculture, and agriculture expands modestly faster over the transition to long-run growth than services.
This transition pattern results largely from the fact that the accumulation of capital causes an expansion of the services sector, but in spite of the growth in real disposable income, this growth is not sufficient to consume the increase in service production at "old" prices. Consequently, the price of services, and by implication, the real exchange rate, falls. This has the effect of releasing labor to manufacturing and to agriculture. Since manufacturing is marginally more labor intensive than agriculture, it tends to benefit slightly more than agriculture. In the long-run equilibrium, the share of services, manufacturing and agriculture in GDP are roughly 52 percent, 40 percent, and 8 percent, respectively. This analysis, while only illustrative, suggests that infrastructure while related to institutional structure, is by itself, unlikely to raise the per capita income of sub-Saharan countries, as a group, to an appreciable level. We next focus on the effect of institutions in addition to the improvement in infrastructure.
Experiment: the dynamic effect of institutions
In this case, we draw upon the results MacFarlan et al. (2003) and add an additional 1.7 percentage points the country's rate of growth in factor productivity. The effect on growth in real income per capita is shown in figure 7 . Initially, growth in per capita GDP begins at about 2.7 percent, and declines slowly as capital accumulates to about 2.4 percent per year. Notice that this path exhibits much less of a decline compared to the other two paths. This occurs because the relatively high rate of factor productivity growth greatly dampens the decline in the marginal physical product of capital. Effectively, the region is able to maintain a slower decline in the growth rate over the same interval of time compared to the other simulations. 
Conclusions
The growth experience of countries during the last half of the 20 century suggests that "accidents" of geography and the presidents of history are not a poverty trap. The evidence is also clear that institutions matter. Institutional reform as Rodrik mentions (2002), does not travel well, i.e., another country's institution is difficult to modify and transplant to a second country.
Institutional reform induced by better economic opportunities that increased openness to the world economy is surely "trickle" down reform. These opportunities help create the conditions for institutional reform, but surely they are not sufficient.
Nevertheless, since institutional reform is difficult, it seems that it is also the case that if the agricultural policies of advanced countries not only cause a waste of resources in themselves, but also become barriers to helping induce reform, then even more pressures should be brought to bear that encourage their use of first-best (i.e., non-market distorting) policy instruments. Surely the sub-Saharan countries have a major vested interest in the Doha round of trade negotiations that should be induced by more than 23 just getting prices right. They also should have a vested interest in fostering regional trade among themselves with prospects for fostering institutional reform.
Thus measures of the welfare gains from trade reform for advanced economies may largely entail the typical decline in deadweight losses. For countries that experience an induced institutional reform, the gains are likely to be far larger. This may cause the indirect feed-back effects on welfare in advanced countries caused by trade expansion to likewise be significant.
We conclude that (1) initial conditions matter, but they are becoming easier to overcome for many of the same reasons that has driven the second wave of world globalization, (2) institutional change is induced by the potential for economic gain, and thus the incentive for change follows the emergence of economic opportunities, (3) however, there is no compelling reasons to think that societies will naturally gravitate toward good institutions, all else constant (i.e., bad institutions could persist indefinitely in static or worsening economic conditions, this is the main reason for the trickle down feature of trade induced institutional reform), and (4) while a democratic form of governance that allows for relatively free entry and competition among political entrepreneurs is one means of fostering 24 institutional change, Mohtadi and Roe (2003) , change can well be brought about by non-democratic means of governance.
